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1. Introduction 
The interbank market is a crucial player in monetary policy transmission (Vari 2019; 
Freixas 2008). Consequently, a key objective of monetary policy is to ensure the smooth 
functioning of such a market. The increasing degree of interconnectedness among banks and 
complexity of interbank networks in recent decades enable efficient risk management and risk 
transfer but are also a potential source of contagion and systemic risk. Hence, analyzing the 
mechanisms of such interconnectedness in the interbank market is important to understand how 
turmoil influences the transmission of monetary policy.  
Identifying the strategic interbank network players is crucial. Indeed, during the global 
financial crisis of 2007-2008, dominant interbank players did not actively fulfill their role as 
liquidity transmitters in the interbank market. On the one hand, dominant lenders (Hubs) hoarded 
liquidity as a result of widespread counterparty risks and fear about their solvency standards. This 
led to severe disruptions in the wholesale liquidity market (Berrospide 2013). On the other hand, 
dominant interbank borrowers (Authorities) that are heavily interconnected to those Hubs are 
subject to panic, which in the worst scenario may lead to widespread contagion. Therefore, the 
global financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis led to vast monetary easing policies 
around the globe and to the introduction of non-standard monetary policy measures called 
unconventional monetary policies to reduce tensions in the interbank market. Recent studies have 
highlighted the extensive amount of liquidity provided by the central banks of advanced countries 
to lower interest rates and affect the lending conditions of financial institutions (FIs) (Brana et al. 
2018; Hofmann 2014; Keating et al. 2018; Wang 2019). Besides, central banks bought mortgage-
backed securities, private sector debts, governmental bonds and followed other types of asset 
purchase programs at a large scale.  
Such policies, which aim to support economic recovery, not only have an influence on 
liquidity and credit conditions of FIs, but also on equity markets. The reaction of bank stock returns 
to monetary policy announcements provides information on the impact of monetary policies on 
bank performance and more generally on their effectiveness in regulating the economy (Yin et al., 
2010). The conventional and unconventional monetary policies affect the investment decisions of 
stock traders by shifting market expectations on future central bank policy rates and other effective 
macroeconomic indicators. The volatility of bank stock prices acts as an indicator of investors’ 
trust in the banking system and in monetary authorities during the implementation of such policies. 
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Bank stock returns depend on economic factors and bank-specific characteristics and hence 
differently react to monetary policy announcements. Yin et al. (2013) examine how the reactions 
of banks’ stock prices to changes in the Fed funds rate are associated with banks’ specific 
characteristics. They find that large banks and banks that rely more on non-deposit funding are 
more sensitive to such monetary policy changes whereas banks with higher capital ratios are less 
responsive. Ricci (2015) investigates the determinants of cumulative abnormal returns derived 
from banks' specific characteristics during the announcement of monetary policy actions by the 
European central bank (ECB). Her results show that the stock returns of banks with higher capital 
and liquidity ratios and lower systemic risk are less sensitive to monetary policy changes. Banks 
perceived as less safe by investors are more sensitive to monetary policy decisions.  
This study contributes to the literature by investigating how bank stock returns respond to 
monetary policy announcements depending on the bank’s position in the interbank network. More 
precisely, we investigate whether the position and strength of a bank within the interbank network 
weaken or strengthen stock market reactions to expansionary and restrictive monetary policy 
announcements. Some studies have focused on the impact of monetary policy on the functioning 
of the interbank market. Fiordelisi et al. (2014) and Aït-sahalia et al. (2012) show that standard 
monetary policy announcements have an impact on risk premia on the interbank market. 
Szczerbowicz (2015) argues that interbank transactions enhance monitoring and refinement of 
financial information among counterparties and, to such an extent, the ECB implements 
unconventional monetary policies to ensure smooth functioning of the interbank market. In 
addition, banks differently interact with their counterparties on the interbank market depending on 
the type of monetary policy. Ehrmann & Worms (2001) document that during expansionary 
monetary policies small banks tend to deposit short-term funds in large banks. However, during 
restrictive monetary policies, to extend new loans, small banks rely on the domestic interbank 
market to attract funds while large banks receive liquidity from abroad. Bianchi & Bigio (2014) 
highlight the impact of monetary policies on banks' reserves and on the market volume of interbank 
loans. Following monetary policy implementation, banks target different reserve and liquidity 
ratios depending on their interaction with other banks in the interbank network. Moreover, 
Ehrmann (2003) shows that the degree of bank liquidity is a key factor determining its response to 
monetary policy via reducing or increasing its loans. Therefore, the extent to which access to 
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interbank liquid funds is more or less easy is expected to influence the reaction of banks’ stock 
prices to central bank announcements.  
Our paper is also related to several studies that have used bank network topology statistics 
to draw an accurate picture of the whole system. Martinez-Jaramillo et al. (2014) and Rørdam & 
Bech (2009) compare the topologies of interbank exposure networks in different countries as well 
as those of payment flows and draw different topological characteristics of both mentioned 
networks. Iori et al. (2008); Kuzubaş et al. (2014) and Soramäki et al. (2007) assess the network 
topology of payment systems in different countries and look into the efficiency of the interbank 
market and the contribution of each bank to system stability. Chinazzi et al. (2013) and Soramäki 
et al. (2007) show that small and large banks are more willing to interact with each other in the 
interbank network than banks of the same size. Also, Gabrieli & Georg (2014) highlight the higher 
access of banks with strong network centrality to the interbank liquidity market. We use network 
topology statistics to capture the interconnectedness among banks in the interbank network. These 
statistics enable us to quantify how banks can more or less easily have access to wholesale liquid 
funds. We distinguish local from systemwide network topology. While local network position 
measures the immediate access of banks to the interbank funds, systemwide network position 
assesses the critical role that each bank plays in the whole interbank market. We argue that the 
perception of the riskiness of banks by investors and thus their sensitivity to monetary policy 
decisions should be influenced by their interbank network characteristics especially in crisis times. 
To conduct our research question, we consider the reaction of European bank stock prices 
to monetary policy announcements (conventional and unconventional) by the ECB during both the 
global and European sovereign debt crises (2008-2012) by focusing on the role of interbank 
network topology in European countries. Our findings highlight that the sensitivity of bank stock 
prices to announcements of both expansionary and restrictive monetary policies are not only 
influenced by specific risk factors but also by banks' position in the interbank network. On the 
whole, our findings indicate that the stock prices of banks with stronger local network positions 
are less sensitive to monetary policy announcements indicating that the market values interbank 
borrowing diversification. However, those of banks with stronger system-wide positions are more 
sensitive to these announcements. Dominant interbank borrowers that are linked with dominant 
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interbank lenders are presumably perceived as risky in times of crisis probably because of liquidity 
hoarding behaviors of dominant lenders and contagion risk.  
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 describes the data, variables and 
methodology, while section 3 presents the results of our study. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Sample and Methodology 
This section presents the sample and the methodology used for the event study as well as 
the subsequent regression analysis. 
2.1. Sample 
We examine monetary policy announcements (conventional and unconventional) by the 
European Central Bank in crisis period from 2008 to 2012. The information on these 
announcements are collected from the ECB official press releases.  
 We classify monetary policies in two categories: (a) expansionary measures and (b) 
restrictive and policy-inaction measures1. Expansionary measures include liquidity provision 
(LPPs) and asset purchase (APPs) programs, which are the ECB’s unconventional monetary tools 
as well as interest rate cuts (IR_CUT) which refer to conventional monetary policy tools. In the 
asset purchase program, the ECB buys the undervalued banks’ securities or securities that are 
highly volatile during crisis times. Excess liquidity provisions are implemented by the ECB when 
the normal liquidity measures are not properly working during a financial crisis and thereupon, the 
ECB offers additional liquidity tools such as long-term refinancing operations (LTROs) with 
longer maturities. A restrictive or policy-inaction measure is when the ECB decides to increase or 
leave the interest rate (IR_UNC_INC) unchanged. 
To deal with overlapping events, we apply the following criteria:  
First, according to Ricci (2015), when several events belonging to the same monetary 
policy classification are announced on the same day, we count them as a single event. For example, 
on 12/08/2011 the ECB announced conducting two long-term refinancing operations (LTROs) 
                                                          
1
 Consistent with Aït-Sahalia et al. (2012), we group restrictive and policy inaction measures together as restrictive 
measures were scarce during the financial crisis. 
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with a maturity of 36 months and a reduction of the reserve ratio. All these events are treated as a 
single event in the liquidity provision program (LPP) category. 
Second, to identify the main event, consistent with Ricci (2015), we consider the 
announcement of a change in monetary policy (both conventional and unconventional monetary 
policies) as the main event, dropping from the event study the announcements of policy-inaction 
decisions or decisions to continue with a measure previously defined: e.g., on 6/9/2012, the ECB 
announced the details on the implementation of the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs). It 
also announced the decision to leave unchanged the interest rate on the main refinancing operations 
(MROs), Marginal Lending Facilities (MLFs) and deposit facilities. Therefore, we consider the 
first event as the main event. 
Third, when the ECB implemented unconventional monetary policy tools for the first time, 
we consider this as the main event. For example, on 8/10/2008, the ECB first announced its list of 
extraordinary liquidity measures to help combat the financial crisis by introducing the fixed-rate 
full-allotment (FRFA). It also decided to reduce the main refinancing rate by 50 basis points. In 
this case, we give more relevance to the unconventional monetary policy announcement. However, 
if it is not the first time that such an unconventional policy is implemented, we give more relevance 
to the conventional measure.  
Fourth, with respect to the frequency of unconventional monetary policy announcements, 
we give more relevance to the less frequent ones with longer time-interval between each 
announcement. On 6/10/2011, the ECB announced the second covered bond purchase program 
(CBPP2) and also 12-months and 13-months LTROs. Because CBPP2 was announced more than 
two years after CBPP1 (7/5/2009), we consider it as the main event, dropping LTROs from the 
event study analysis (details on LTROs decisions were previously announced on 4/8/2011 and 
9/6/2011)2. 
Our final sample includes 72 announcements (conventional and unconventional) 
corresponding to 26 expansionary measures (6 interest rate cuts, 13 LPPs and 7 APPs programs) 
and 46 restrictive or policy-inaction measures. 
Daily stock market data of listed European banks from EEA (European Economic Area) 
are collected from the Bloomberg database and to retrieve annual bank-specific factors, we use the 
                                                          
2The third and fourth criteria help identifying 5 single events. Running a robustness check without these events does 
not alter our conclusions.  
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BankScope database. We omit savings, mutual and cooperative banks due to their specificities in 
terms of interbank relationships (Boss & Elsinger, 2004; BIS, 2001; Worms, 2001). Our final 
sample only includes listed commercial, investment, and real estate banks. After eliminating banks 
for which BankScope does not report information on our variables of interest and after merging 
these datasets, our final sample of listed banks consists of 37 banks from 10 EEA countries. We 
have winsorized extreme bank year observations for our dependent and bank-level control 
variables (1% lowest and highest values). 
[Insert Table 1] 
2.2. Bank Network 
To construct our interbank exposure network, we first need to estimate the bilateral 
interbank transactions between each pair of entities in the interbank loan and deposit markets. 
Indeed, a main weakness when studying the interbank exposure network is the lack of access to 
the bilateral interbank transactions as banks are not required to report this to regulatory authorities 
in most of the European countries. The only available bank-level data is aggregate interbank loans 
and deposits for each bank. Therefore, to scrutinize network characteristics at the bank level, we 
need to estimate these bilateral relationships by applying mathematical algorithms. We use the 
minimum density algorithm introduced by Anand et al. (2015). A notable point of applying this 
method is its economic rationality: producing and maintaining extra interbank links is costly and 
should be minimized3. Anand et al. (2018) compare different network-reconstruction methods for 
25 distinct financial markets and show that minimum density is the best method to preserve the 
structure of links. Because interbank transactions are between both listed and unlisted banks, we 
construct our interbank networks by including all available commercial, investment and real estate 
banks in the BankScope database in each country. Therefore, our network statistics capture 
connections of banks in our sample with all possible banks in their respective country.  Following 
Craig and Von Peter (2010)  and Anand et al. (2015), we thus obtain a self-contained network at 
the country level excluding cross-border linkages4. By comparing the generated self-contained 
network against a real-world network excluding cross-border linkages, Anand et al. (2015) show 
                                                          
3 See Anand et al. (2015) for more details on interbank network simulation. 
4
 Note that, with the crisis, a tendency for a “home bias” in interbank lending occurred (ECB, 2012). The global 
financial crisis led to a precipitous retrenchment in cross-border linkages in Europe amplified by the euro area 
sovereign debt crisis. 
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that the minimum density approach is the best approach to preserve the network’s structural 
features.  
The first step to study banking network characteristics (topology) is to characterize its 
features. We thus define each bank as a node indexed by i = 1 to N.  aij corresponds to the link 
that connects node i to j. The interbank market is a directed network in nature. Thus, aij ≠ aji which 
means that if node i has a link with node j, it is not necessary that node j be linked with i. The path 
length of node i to j corresponds to the number of links from i to j. It shows that not all the nodes 
connect to each other directly. However, there could be indirect links between two different nodes 
through others. The geodesic path is the shortest possible distance between two given nodes, i and 
j. It is denoted by gij. Sometimes there is more than one geodesic path between a pair of nodes.  
Figure-1 synthesizes the interbank network configuration of two selected European 
countries (France and Germany) in 2008. Each node represents a bank in the network and the links 
represent the lending-borrowing relationships. Highlighted large nodes represent banks in our 
sample.  
[Insert Figure 1] 
The network tools for capturing connectedness between the nodes can be divided into local 
and system-wide variables. Local network statistics quantify each bank’s interconnectedness with 
its local neighbors. System-wide network statistics assess the interbank network 
interconnectedness based on each bank's position in the whole network. They provide a wider view 
of banks interconnectedness as they measure each bank’s access to the interbank market compared 
with all existing banks in the network.  They thus give information about the possible counterparty, 
contagion and systemic risks that would arise through this interconnectedness. 
We consider In-degree as our local network measurement. In network science, it is the 
number of incoming links to each node. In our study, it corresponds to the number of banks that 
have deposits in bank i. Thus, it is a measure of the bank’s ability to diversify its borrowing on the 
interbank market.  
 = ∑   1 
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Banks’ lending-borrowing relationships play an important role in interest rate setting on 
the interbank market (Temizsoy, Iori, and Montes-Rojas 2015; Cocco, Gomes, and Martins 2009; 
Furfine 2001). Those relationships may in turn increase or reduce the stock price sensitivity of 
banks with strong local interconnectedness to the monetary policy announcements. On the one 
hand, because banks with strong local (In-Degree) positions are connected to a large number of 
immediate interbank lenders, they are expected to be sheltered from short-term impacts of 
monetary policy changes as they optimally diversify their interbank borrowing. Besides, those 
banks are more exposed to market discipline as they are monitored by a large number of 
counterparties. On the other hand, borrowing diversification may increase uncertainty as a result 
of higher asymmetry of information. Indeed, diversification lessens the relationship lending 
advantages of banks with few informed lenders (Temizsoy et al. 2015). 
Our tool to capture system-wide network position is Authority that measures the 
importance of each bank’s total number of interbank lenders (incoming links) relative to the other 
banks in the network but also considers the strength of its lenders based on their outgoing links. 
Therefore, banks with strong Authority are those that are connected to strong Hubs (dominant 
lenders) in the network. Authority is calculated based on the HITS algorithm (Kleinberg 1999). 
Kleinberg algorithm includes an iterative procedure for computing the Authority centrality of each 
node. The two network variables (In-degree and Authority) are calculated based on the software 
developed by Bastian and Heymann (2009).  
As documented by León et al. (2018), during crisis times, dominant interbank lenders tend 
to hoard liquidity as a result of widespread counterparty risks and fear about their solvency 
standards. Therefore, dominant borrowers with strong linkages with those banks may be exposed 
to severe liquidity risk. This might cause higher stock price reactions to the monetary policy 
announcements. However, dominant interbank borrowers might be less sensitive to the monetary 
policy announcements if equity investors expect that those dominant borrowers will be bailed out 
by the lender of last resort in case of default to avoid contagion and systemic risk (Temizsoy et al., 
2017).  
 Figure-2 represents banks in our sample based on their local and systemwide 
interconnectedness in 2008. As visualized in this figure, there is a positive correlation between In-
Degree and Authority for the banks in our sample. However, few banks are characterized by strong 
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Authority and weak In-Degree. Those banks are considered as a source of contagion and systemic 
risk as they are more connected to the strongly interconnected lenders, have a less diversified 
borrowing structure in the interbank market and are less exposed to market discipline. This is 
consistent with Temizsoy et al. (2017) findings on the network visualization analysis of Euro area 
and US e-MID market.  
[Insert Figure 2] 
2.3. Event study 
We measure the reaction of a bank’s stock price to monetary policy announcements by the 
ECB by employing an event-study approach.  
Following Fiordelisi et al. (2014) and Ricci (2015), cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
are estimated using the standard market model over a 252 days estimation period ending 20 days 
prior to the announcement date. These estimations include countries’ main market indexes. 
Consistent with Aït-sahalia et al. (2012) and Ricci (2015), we consider a one-day event window 
(0, 0), a two-day event window (0, 1), a three-day event window (-1, 1) and a five-day event 
window (-1, 3). Subsequent to estimating CARs, we apply parametric Boehmer et al. (1991) and 
Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) test statistics to examine whether the reaction of bank stock prices to 
those events is significantly different from zero.  
Standard cross-sectional Boehmer et al. (1991) test takes into account serial correlation of 
ARs and event induced volatility. The standardized residual is calculated as: 
SRi = 	
( ,)
   ∑ (  (
   )   ∑ (  (  )   
 
Where !"#($%, $&) is the cumulative abnormal return over the event window, '()is the 
estimated standard deviation of abnormal returns during the estimation period, Ts is the number of 
days in the event window, Rmt is the market return on day t, #* is the average market return during 
the estimation period and T is the number of days in the estimation period. Then, the Z-statistics 
for testing H0: CARs = 0 are given by: 
2 
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To consider the cross-correlation of ARs, we use the Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) test 
statistic. It adjusts the average ARs’ variance in the event window using the residual correlation in 
the estimation window. The Z-statistics for testing H0: CARs = 0 are given by: 
ZKolari & Pynnonen =
+  , -
+ 
 +(+) ∑  (-
. ∑ /+ )+  + 
∗ 1 %. 2̅%( 4.%)2̅  
Where 5̅ is the mean of the sample cross-correlations of the estimation period residuals and 
N is the number of observations in the respective sample. 
Given the important role of interbank market in reallocation of liquidity between banks and 
transmission of monetary policies, it is important to investigate the reaction of bank stock returns 
to monetary policy announcements depending on their strong or weak positions in the interbank 
network. For this purpose, we distinguish banks with extremely strong or weak network position 
in the interbank market by computing the 25th and the 75th percentiles of our local network variable 
(In-Degree) and our system-wide network variable (Authority). We then test the significance of 
the reaction of banks’ stock prices to monetary policy announcements on these sub-samples. 
2.4. Regression model 
To investigate the determinants of banks’ stock prices reaction, we run two OLS models. 
The first model considers the determinants of the absolute value of CARs on the ECB expansionary 
measure announcements and the second model on the ECB restrictive measure announcements. 
!"#,6789:;92<  = α1+ α2 In-Degreei,t-1 + α3 Authorityi,t-1+ α4 In-Degreei,t-1* AssetPurchasej + α5 Authorityi,t-1* 
AssetPurchasej + α6 In-Degreei,t-1* IR_CUTj + α7 Authorityi,t-1* IR_CUTj  + α8 BFi,t-1+α9 ILDz,t + α10 
Sovereign_Crisist + α11 Global_Crisist + α12 AssetPurchasej  + α13 IR_CUTj  + ei,t 
!"#,
=:2>?=  = α1++α2 In-Degreei,t-1 + α3 Authorityi,t-1 +α4 BFi,t-1+α5 ILDz,t + α6 Sovereign_Crisist + α7 
Global_Crisist + ei,t 
5 
6 
3 
4 
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Where !"#, stands for the absolute value of cumulative abnormal returns on the (-1, 3) event 
window5 for the i-th bank to the j-th announcement. α1 is a constant, BF is a vector of bank factors 
for bank i in year t-1, In-Degree and Authority are our network variables, and ILD is Interbank 
Loans-Density of country z in year t defined as the ratio of aggregate interbank loans to aggregate 
bank assets at the sample level within each country. We use the one year lagged value of our 
network variables as well as our bank-level controls according to Huang, Schwienbacher, and Zhao 
(2012) to avoid bias in our estimations due to potential endogeneity issues. Sovereign_Crisis is an 
European sovereign crisis dummy variable that takes the value of one for the 2010-2011 period 
and Global_Crisis takes the value of one for the year 2008. AssetPurchase is an asset purchase 
program dummy that takes the value of one for the events involved in this program. The IR_CUT 
dummy refers to the ECB monetary policy decisions to cut interest rates. 
Bank level control variables (BF) include the ratio of net loans to deposit and short-term 
funds (NL_DSTF), the Interbank ratio (IntrBR), a bank size variable (Bank_Size), the Z-Score, the 
cost to income ratio (Cost_Inc), Return on Average Assets (ROAA) and Equity to total assets 
(Eq_TA). 
Ricci (2015) and Yin & Yang (2013) show that liquid banks are less sensitive to monetary 
policy announcements. We consider NL_DSTF and InterBR as bank liquidity measurements. 
NL_DSTF considers the amounts of deposits and short-term debt employed by banks to fund their 
loan portfolio. A lower ratio indicates higher bank liquidity. We expect a positive relationship 
between this ratio and CAR as illiquid banks (banks with a higher ratio) are perceived as riskier by 
investors. Interbank ratio (IntrBR) is the ratio of ‘‘Due from banks’’ to ‘‘Loans from banks’’. 
Banks in a lending position on the interbank market are less likely to experience liquidity tensions. 
In general, and consistently with our hypotheses, we assume that banks with high interbank ratios 
are less sensitive to monetary policy announcements as they benefit more from interacting with 
their interbank competitors than from central bank intervention.  
Castrén, Fitzpatrick, & Sydow (2006) show that the reaction of banks’ stock returns to 
various events depends on the firm’s size. Larger banks are more sensitive to banking events than 
                                                          
5
 For robustness, we run our regressions on the CARs estimated on 1-day (0, 0) 2-day (0,1) and 3-day (-1,1) event 
windows (see 4.1). 
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small ones. To control for bank size effects, we consider the logarithm of bank total assets 
(Bank_Size). We expect a positive relationship between bank size and CAR.  
Yin & Yang (2013) highlight that banks with lower default risk (higher Z-Score) are less 
sensitive to monetary policy changes. We also introduce the Z-Score, which is an indicator of 
distance to bankruptcy. The higher this ratio is, the lower the probability of default. Z-score in this 
study is calculated as: 
@ABC5D =  
E	**9FGHIJKL M**9F
E	:N*9F  
where ROAmma3 is the 3-year rolling window average return on assets defined as the ratio of net 
income to average total assets, (Equity/TA)mma3 represents the 3-year rolling window average of 
equity to total assets and ROAsdma3 stands for the 3-year rolling window standard deviation of 
the return on assets. All the ratios are in percentages. The expected relationship between Z-score 
and CARs is negative. By reducing its default probability (higher Z-Score), the bank is considered 
as less risky by investors.  
We include the return on average assets (ROAA) as a measure of the bank’s overall 
profitability. We expect a negative relationship between CARs and ROAA since the stock price of 
more profitable banks might be less influenced by monetary policy announcements. 
We consider the cost to income ratio (Cost-income) as a proxy of bank cost efficiency. 
Consistent with Ricci (2015), we expect a positive coefficient for Cost-income as banks with 
higher cost efficiency (lower value of Cost-income) on average are less sensitive to ECB 
unconventional monetary policies. 
Madura and Schnusenberg (2000), Ricci (2015) and Yin et al. (2013) find that banks with 
higher capital ratios are less sensitive to monetary policy changes. Increasing bank capital ratios 
means reducing leverage and consequently lowering liquidity risk. We consider Equity to total 
asset ratio (Eq_TA) as a proxy of bank capitalization. We expect banks with a higher capital ratio 
to be less sensitive to monetary policy announcements.   
As indicated above, we also introduce a variable at the country level (ILD) to control for 
country effects. We expect a positive sign for the coefficient of this variable since banks in a 
country with high interbank Loans-Density should be more affected by monetary policy changes.
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The correlation matrix and descriptive statistics are presented in Table-2 and Table-3 
respectively. 
The correlation coefficients between our independent variables are low except between 
bank size as measured by the natural logarithm of total assets (Bank-Size) and one of our network 
measures (In-Degree). To check whether such correlation affects our results, we have performed 
two robustness tests. We have replaced Bank-Size by a size dummy variable which is not correlated 
with In-Degree. We have also orthogonalized the logarithm of total assets with our network 
measure (In-Degree) and introduced our network variable and the residual component of bank 
size. All the specifications yield qualitatively similar results (see 4.3.). Thus, all the results 
presented below are those obtained with Bank-Size and In-Degree introduced simultaneously6.  
[Insert Table 2] 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
3. Results 
3.1 Event study 
The results of our event study for EEA countries are presented in Table 4. Conventional 
monetary policies are classified into the ECB regular interest rate decisions to cut (IR_CUT), 
increase or leave unchanged the interest rate (IR_UNC_INC) and unconventional measures 
include liquidity provision (LPP) and asset purchase programs (APP). The main market index for 
each country is chosen to estimate the market model. Overall, when considering the full sample 
irrespective of banks’ network characteristics (Panel A) we do not find significant reactions of 
bank stock returns to announcements of either expansionary or restrictive monetary policies.  
[Insert Table 4] 
                                                          
6
 We also perform multicollinearity checks among all variables by running a VIF test. The results of the VIF test in 
Table 5 and Table 6 indicate low multicollinearity. In addition, Table A1 reports VIF test results for all our independent 
and control variables in equation 6. The VIF statistics range from 1.13 to 2.20 indicating low multicollinearity among 
the variables. 
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However, by considering banks’ network positions (Panels B and C), we find that bank 
stock returns significantly and differently react depending on the strength of their local and system-
wide position. 
While stock returns do not react to conventional expansionary monetary policy 
announcements for banks with either extremely weak or extremely strong network positions, they 
react positively to unconventional monetary policy announcements for banks with extremely 
strong local network positions and negatively for banks with extremely strong system-wide 
network positions.  
More precisely, we find that stock returns of banks with a strong local network position 
positively react to the announcements of LPPs, while banks with a strong systemwide network 
position negatively react to these announcements. The announcements of LPP can be interpreted 
by the market as a signal of higher liquidity risk in the banking system or be perceived positively 
as it increases the supply of liquidity on the interbank market. On the one hand, banks with strong 
Authority are considered as a significant source of contagion and systemic risk. Therefore, they 
are possibly more affected by the negative signal transmitted by the LPPs announcements.  This 
could lead to the negative reaction. On the other hand, LPPs might be perceived positively by 
investors of banks with strong In-Degree as, due to their more diversified borrowing structure in 
the interbank market, these announcements might only signal better bank liquidity positions.  
Considering Asset Purchase programs, only CARs of banks with strong In-Degree 
positively react to these announcements. By purchasing risky securities and covered bonds, the 
ECB assumes the default risk and liquidity risk of these assets for Euro-zone members, which 
implies lower risk-taking by investors. This is perceived as good news by investors of banks with 
strong local interconnectedness as those policies might reinforce bank liquidity positions. These 
announcements might lead to contrasted reactions for banks with a strong system-wide position as 
it also signals liquidity problems. Our findings also highlight that stock returns of banks with weak 
network positions do not react to unconventional monetary policy announcements. 
Unconventional monetary policies are implemented to reduce tensions in the interbank network. 
Banks with weak local and system-wide positions are not active players in the interbank network, 
which might explain why there is no significant reaction to those announcements.  
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The results for policy-inaction or restrictive monetary policies (IR_UNC_INC) show that 
stock returns of banks with weak In-Degree and Authority in the interbank network negatively 
react to these announcements. Bernanke and Blinder (1988) argue that deposits fall during 
restrictive monetary policy regimes and banks may look for other source of liabilities to fund their 
loan portfolios. Because of the limited access to the interbank market, weakly interconnected banks 
may experience higher borrowing cost, which could possibly explain these negative reactions.  
3.2 Network variables and the impact of monetary policy announcements on the absolute 
value of CARs 
So far, we find that banks with distinct interbank network positions differently react to 
monetary policy announcements. To go deeper in our empirical investigation, we examine how 
the interbank network topology influences the extent of bank stock price reaction to monetary 
policy announcements. 
To conduct our OLS model, we select the interest rate cut, liquidity provision programs 
and asset purchases programs announced by the ECB as expansionary monetary policies and 
increased or unchanged interest rates as restrictive and neutral monetary policies from 2008 to 
2012. We run the regression on the absolute value of CARs of the 37 European banks in our sample 
to determine the impact of banks' network measures on the sensitivity of their stock prices to the 
ECB's announcements. 
Table 5 reports the results of our regressions explaining the absolute value of EEA listed 
banks’ CARs in response to ECB expansionary and restrictive monetary policy announcements. 
We find contradictory impacts of local and system-wide network measures on the absolute value 
of CARs during announcements of both conventional and unconventional monetary policies. 
While In-Degree has a negative impact on the absolute value of CARs, Authority is positively 
related to banks’ absolute CARs. Our findings highlight that banks with stronger local 
interconnectedness are perceived as less risky by investors as they have stronger capacity to 
diversify their borrowing through the interbank market and are more exposed to the market 
discipline in the interbank network. Consequently, they are less affected by these ECB monetary 
programs. Banks with strong system-wide interconnectedness could obtain cheaper liquidity 
through the interbank market because of their wider access to the interbank network during normal 
times. However, they possibly lose their system-wide network advantages during stress times as 
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they are connected to the dominant interbank lenders which are characterized by a high probability 
of hoarding liquidity during turmoil. Accordingly, they are perceived risky by market investors, 
which makes their stock price react more to the ECB monetary policy announcements.  
[Insert Table 5] 
Considering control variables, the significantly positive coefficient of the logarithm of total 
assets (Bank_Size) shows that larger banks are more sensitive to the ECB monetary policy 
announcements. For liquidity, the significantly negative coefficient of NL_DSTF indicates that 
less liquid banks are less sensitive to the ECB restrictive monetary policy changes, the significantly 
positive coefficients of IntrBR suggests that banks with a net lending position in the interbank 
market are more sensitive to monetary policy announcements.  
The Z-score has a negative and statistically significant coefficient for both expansionary 
and restrictive measures. Banks with lower default risk are less sensitive to the ECB monetary 
policy announcements. 
The interbank Loans-Density variable (ILD) is positively and significantly related to the 
absolute CARs, which implies that banks in a country with higher share of interbank loans to 
banks’ total assets are more sensitive to both expansionary and restrictive monetary policy 
announcements compared to banks in other countries. 
  To sum-up, we find that a stronger local network position decreases the sensitivity of bank 
stock prices to monetary policy announcements, while a stronger system-wide network position is 
associated with stronger reactions to these announcements. Thus, our results indicate that interbank 
borrowing diversification and market discipline are valued by the market and lead to less reactions 
to monetary policy announcements. Strong system-wide interconnectedness is perceived as risky 
in times of crisis and leads to higher market reactions following monetary policy announcements. 
3.3 Does diversification matter for dominant borrowers? 
Given that a diversified borrowing structure in the interbank market is valued by investors 
and results in less reaction to monetary policy announcements, an important question is whether it 
can mitigate the negative effect of being a dominant borrower.  
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To address this issue, we introduce a dummy variable (In-Degree75) that takes the value 
of one if In-Degree is greater than or equal to the 75th percentile value and interact it with the 
systemwide network position (Authority). 
As shown in Table 6, the Authority of banks with high In-Degree does not have an impact 
on the absolute value of CARs during announcements of expansionary monetary policies. 
Concerning restrictive monetary policy announcements, while Authority has a positive impact on 
the absolute value of CARs, its positive effect is lower for banks with high In-Degree. Whereas 
equity investors might believe that banks with stronger systemwide connections are more exposed 
to liquidity risk and contagion, these types of interconnectedness might be perceived less risky 
when banks are backed by optimally diversified lenders in the interbank network7. 
 
4. Robustness checks 
 To check the robustness of our results, we conduct several sensitivity analyses.  
4.1. Shorter event windows 
As a robustness check, we run our regressions on the absolute value of CARs estimated on 1-day 
(0,0), 2-day (0, 1) and 3-day (-1, 1) event windows. When considering expansionary measures 
(Table A2), results for 3-day event window remain unchanged. However, by reducing the event 
window to 2-day and 1-day, network variables either local or system-wide lose their significance 
in explaining the absolute value of CARs for APPs. Results obtained when considering the 
announcements of restrictive monetary policies are unaltered for all event windows (Table A3). 
4.2. Alternative network measures 
We perform a robustness check by considering two alternative measures of local and system-wide 
network characteristics. We choose Degree as a representative of bank local position and 
Closeness Centrality as a representative of bank system-wide position in the interbank network.  
                                                          
7
 We also ran regressions using an alternative definition for high diversification, In-Degree50, that takes the value of 
one if In-Degree is greater than or equal to the median value. We find similar results: the impact of Authority is 
lower for high values of In-Degree (see 4.4). 
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Degree, in network science, is the total number of incoming and outgoing links to and from 
each node. In our study, it corresponds to the number of banks that have deposits in or a loan from 
bank i. Thus, it is a measure of the bank’s ‘liability & asset sides’ diversification.  
 = ∑   + ∑   
Closeness centrality measures how close each bank is to the other banks in the network 
based on distance8. So, banks with high closeness ratios could have more access to the interbank 
market as they can lend or borrow more directly to and from other banks. They can facilitate the 
spread of liquidity as well as the spread of shocks. It is calculated by measuring the reverse distance 
of each bank to all other banks: 
! =  %∑ ∑ NOPO O  
In which Q is the shortest distance between banks i and j. 
Table A4 represents our results. Our main findings for both expansionary and restrictive 
monetary policies remain unchanged. 
4.3. Orthogonalization of bank size and the network variable and Size Dummy variable 
The logarithm of bank total assets (Bank-Size) and In-Degree are correlated at 61%. To ensure that 
this correlation does not affect our results, we perform a robustness test by orthogonalizing the 
logarithm of total assets with our network measure (In-Degree). We then introduce our network 
variable and the residual component of bank size. Alternatively, we replace Bank_Size with a 
dummy variable (Size_Dummy) that takes the value of one for small banks (banks with total assets 
less than one billion Euro) and zero otherwise. As shown in Table A5, our main results remain 
unchanged. 
 4.4. Alternative definition for high diversification of borrowing structure 
When looking at whether borrowing structure diversification can mitigate the negative effect of 
being a dominant borrower, we consider an alternative definition for high diversification, In-
                                                          
8
  Distance is measured based on the number of intermediate banks between two arbitrary banks. 
9 
8 
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Degree50, that takes the value of one if In-Degree is greater than or equal to the median value. We 
find similar results: the impact of Authority is lower for high values of In-Degree (Table A6). 
 
5. Conclusion 
This study investigates the channels of monetary policy transmission on European banks 
by analyzing the effects of ECB actions. Specifically, we investigate the reaction of bank stock 
prices to monetary policy announcements by considering banks’ network position on the interbank 
market. Our findings show that banks’ stock price reaction to monetary policy announcements 
strongly depends on their network characteristics. A larger number of immediate local lenders 
decreases the sensitivity of bank stock prices to monetary policy announcements, while a stronger 
system-wide network borrower position is associated with a stronger reaction to these 
announcements. Indeed, bank network topology captures the extent to which banks have more or 
less easy access to interbank liquidity as well as counterparty risk. Our findings shed light on the 
importance of a diversified borrowing structure in the interbank market as it is valued by the market 
and results in less reactions to monetary policy announcements. In addition, we show that banks 
with a strong system-wide network position are presumably perceived riskier by market 
participants because of their fragile network position in the interbank market during crisis times: 
they are connected to dominant interbank lenders that can hoard liquidity during financial turmoil. 
Therefore, our findings indicate that regulatory authorities should require such banks to hold more 
liquidity to reduce their dependency to non-standard monetary policies.  
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Figure-1: Interbank network configurations of two selected European countries 
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Figure-2: Representation of banks in our sample based on their local (In-Degree) and systemwide interconnectedness (Authority) in 
2008 
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Table-1: Sample of banks 
Bank Name Country 
Name 
Aareal Bank AG GERMANY 
Allied Irish Banks plc IRELAND 
Alpha Bank AE GREECE 
Attica Bank SA-Bank of Attica SA GREECE 
Baader Bank AG GERMANY 
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA-Gruppo Monte dei Paschi di Siena ITALY 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA SPAIN 
Banco Comercial Portugues, SA-Millennium bcp PORTUGAL 
Banco de Sabadell SA SPAIN 
Banco Espirito Santo SA PORTUGAL 
Banco Santander SA SPAIN 
Bank of Ireland-Governor and Company of the Bank of Ireland IRELAND 
Bankinter SA SPAIN 
Banque de la Reunion SA FRANCE 
Banque Tarneaud FRANCE 
BKS Bank AG AUSTRIA 
BNP Paribas SA FRANCE 
Commerzbank AG GERMANY 
Credit Industriel et Commercial SA - CIC FRANCE 
Credito Emiliano SpA-CREDEM ITALY 
Deutsche Bank AG GERMANY 
Deutsche Postbank AG GERMANY 
Fonciere de Paris SIIC FRANCE 
IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG GERMANY 
Mediobanca SpA-MEDIOBANCA - Banca di Credito Finanziario Societe per Azioni ITALY 
Merkur-Bank KGaA GERMANY 
National Bank of Greece SA GREECE 
Natixis SA FRANCE 
Oberbank AG AUSTRIA 
OTP Banka Slovensko, as SLOVAKIA 
Pohjola Bank plc-Pohjola Pankki Oyj FINLAND 
Raiffeisen Bank International AG AUSTRIA 
Societe Generale SA FRANCE 
UmweltBank AG GERMANY 
UniCredit Bank AG GERMANY 
UniCredit SpA ITALY 
Vseobecna Uverova Banka a.s. SLOVAKIA 
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Table-2: Correlation matrix 
 
absCAR lagIn-Degree lagAuthority lagBank_Size                      Size_Dummy                      lagROAA                       lagNL_DSTF                            
absCAR 1 
      
lagIn-Degree -0.0577 1 
     
lagAuthority 0.0718 0.3779 1 
    
lagBank_Size                      -0.0182 0.6116 0.3067 1 
   
lagSize_Dummy                      -0.0192 -0.1493 -0.21 -0.4279 1 
  
lagROAA                       -0.0122 -0.0015 -0.0828 -0.1558 0.1289 1 
 
lagNL_DSTF                    -0.0839 -0.2791 -0.1365 -0.1098 0.0418 0.0459 1 
lagEq_TA                      -0.0267 -0.2021 -0.0545 -0.461 0.3519 0.456 0.0139 
lagIntrBR                     0.1383 -0.141 0.0174 -0.0471 -0.0958 0.0915 -0.0995 
lagCost_Inc                   0.0225 0.1169 -0.1268 0.2825 -0.1426 -0.3893 -0.2288 
lagzscore                     -0.0485 -0.043 -0.082 -0.1848 -0.0824 0.222 -0.1013 
ILD 0.2979 0.0813 -0.2208 -0.0993 0.0261 0.139 -0.1471 
Sovereign_Crisis        0.0242 -0.0422 -0.0277 -0.0037 -0.0165 -0.0976 0.0113 
Global_Crisis                          -0.0471 0.0265 -0.0297 -0.0366 0.026 0.2911 -0.0033         
 
lagEq_TA                      lagIntrBR                     lagCost_Inc                lagzscore                     ILD Sovereign_Crisis                Global_Crisis                                  
lagEq_TA                      1 
      
lagIntrBR                     -0.0192 1 
     
lagCost_Inc                   -0.3971 0.0785 1 
    
lagzscore                     0.0433 -0.1161 -0.2875 1 
   
ILD -0.0284 0.0608 0.023 0.133 1 
  
Sovereign_Crisis                0.0169 -0.0299 -0.1034 -0.087 -0.0997 1 
 
Global_Crisis                          0.072 0.1351 -0.1036 0.0757 0.1264 -0.4283 1 
This table presents the correlation matrix for network variables and bank level control variables. All dependent and bank-level control variables are 
winsorized at 1% - 99%. 
 
Table-3: Descriptive Statistics - Dependent and Independent variables 
Variables mean sd min Median Max 
absCAR 0.086 0.568 0 0.01 11.009 
lagIn-Degree 7.167 9.269 0 3 55 
lagAuthority 0.057 0.057 0 0.036 0.429 
lagROAA 0.414 1.231 -6.36 0.489 4.157 
lagNL_DSTF 92.885 32.545 5.462 88.47 201.454 
lagEq_TA 6.959 5.648 1.449 5.997 37.125 
lagIntrBR 70.027 61.084 0.957 54.029 331.69 
lagCost_Inc 62.164 20.906 18.047 60.068 162.202 
Lagzscore 50.199 62.192 0.749 30.293 367.456 
ILD 0.095 0.042 0.022 0.088 0.301 
lagBank_Size 17.768 2.303 12.929 18.135 21.453 
Size_Dummy 0.061 0.24 0 0 1 
IR_CUT 0.083 0.276 0 0 1 
AssetPurchase 0.097 0.296 0 0 1 
Sovereign_Crisis 0.352 0.478 0 0 1 
Global_Crisis 0.182 0.386 0 0 1 
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Table-4: Stock market reaction to announcements of 20 unconventional and 52 conventional 
monetary policies implemented by the ECB for all banks and for banks with extreme value of local 
or system-wide network interconnectedness. 
  
Panel A 
   
Panel B 
   
Panel C 
  
Event 
window 
No. 
Obs 
General   No. 
Obs 
75th 
Percentile 
  No. 
Obs 
25th 
Percentile 
  
 
Asset Purchase Programs (APPs) 
 
      
In-Degree 
   
In-Degree 
  
t 
 
CAAR Boehmer Kolari 
 
CAAR Boehmer Kolari 
 
CAAR Boehmer Kolari 
[-1;1] 259 -0.026124 
  
69 0.0118001 ** 
 
77 0.0135588 
  
[0;0] 259 -0.005252 
  
69 0.0085036 ** 
 
77 0.0070696 
  
[0;1] 259 -0.011973 
  
69 0.0067965 ** 
 
77 0.0191542 
  
[-1;3] 259 -0.045700 
  
69 0.017374 *** * 77 0.0110199 
  
      
Authority 
   
Authority 
  
t 
     
CAAR 
   
CAAR 
  
[-1;1] 
    
63 -0.0590541 
  
70 0.0106294 
  
[0;0] 
    
63 -0.0606077 
  
70 0.0089117 
  
[0;1] 
    
63 -0.0690164 
  
70 0.0131857 
  
[-1;3] 
    
63 -0.1202647 
  
70 0.0121174 
  
 
Liquidity Provision Programs (LPPs) 
 
      
In-Degree 
   
In-Degree 
  
t 
 
CAAR Boehmer Kolari 
 
CAAR Boehmer Kolari 
 
CAAR Boehmer Kolari 
[-1;1] 481 -0.025074 
  
134 -0.0022285 
  
128 -0.0616081 
  
[0;0] 481 -0.008134 
  
134 0.0022236 ** 
 
128 -0.023886 
  
[0;1] 481 -0.016111 
  
134 0.0024713 * 
 
128 -0.0428752 
  
[-1;3] 481 -0.047655 
  
134 -0.013385 
  
128 -0.1146034 
  
      
Authority 
   
Authority 
  
t 
     
CAAR 
   
CAAR 
  
[-1;1] 
    
118 -0.0076544 
  
113 0.0053849 
  
[0;0] 
    
118 -0.004301 *** *** 113 0.0000206 
  
[0;1] 
    
118 0.0028523 
  
113 0.0014354 
  
[-1;3] 
    
118 -0.0127861 
  
113 -0.0041578 
  
 
Interest rate-cut (IR_CUT) 
 
      
In-Degree 
   
In-Degree 
  
t  CAAR Boehmer Kolari 
 
CAAR Boehmer Kolari 
 
CAAR Boehmer Kolari 
[-1;1] 222 -3.31E-06 
  
60 0.0020883 
  
58 -0.0126631 
  
[0;0] 222 0.0044012 
  
60 0.0029265 
  
58 0.0040402 
  
[0;1] 222 0.004983 
  
60 0.0074763 
  
58 -0.0005682 
  
[-1;3] 222 -0.013272 
  
60 -0.0088184 
  
58 -0.0235705 
  
      
Authority 
   
Authority 
  
t 
     
CAAR 
   
CAAR 
  
[-1;1] 
    
58 0.0075941 
  
49 0.0054169 
  
[0;0] 
    
58 -0.0022761 
  
49 0.0000574 
  
[0;1] 
    
58 0.002404 
  
49 0.0029034 
  
[-1;3] 
    
58 0.0068098 
  
49 -0.0034539 
  
 
Increased or unchanged Interest rate (IR_UNC_INC) 
 
      
In-Degree 
   
In-Degree 
  
t 
 
CAAR Boehmer Kolari 
 
CAAR Boehmer Kolari 
 
CAAR Boehmer Kolari 
[-1;1] 1702 -0.036332 
  
473 0.0003532 
  
497 -0.0360779 
  
[0;0] 1702 -0.013703 
  
473 0.0006878 
  
497 -0.0136701 
  
[0;1] 1702 -0.025371 
  
473 0.0001682 
  
497 -0.0253451 
  
[-1;3] 1702 -0.066003 
  
473 -0.001831 
  
497 -0.0669426 ** **       
Authority 
   
Authority 
  
t 
     
CAAR 
   
CAAR 
  
[-1;1] 
    
443 -0.0924315 
  
426 -0.002867 
  
[0;0] 
    
443 -0.0340059 
  
426 -0.0018293 
  
[0;1] 
    
443 -0.0626681 
  
426 -0.0022361 
  
[-1;3] 
    
443 -0.160006 
  
426 -0.0074204 ** 
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Table-5: Impact of interbank network variables on the absolute value of CARs during 
announcements of expansionary and restrictive monetary policies 
                                 (1) (2) 
                                 CAR (-1,3) CAR (-1,3)  
Expansionary MP Restrictive MP 
lagIn-Degree    (A)                  -0.00887** -0.0156*** 
                                 (0.00377) (0.00338) 
lagAuthority     (B)                1.700** 2.548*** 
                                 (0.835) (0.524) 
lagIn-Degree*AssetPurchase   (C)    0.000495 
 
                                 (0.00336) 
 
lagAuthority*AssetPurchase  (D)    -0.410 
 
                                 (0.679) 
 
lagIn-Degree*IR_CUT    (E)           0.00554 
 
                                 (0.00344) 
 
lagAuthority*IR_CUT   (F)           -1.190 
 
                                 (0.754) 
 
IR_CUT                           0.00863 
 
                                 (0.0266) 
 
AssetPurchase                    0.00823 
 
                                 (0.0266) 
 
LagBank_Size                      0.0119*** 0.0187*** 
                                 (0.00449) (0.00622) 
lagROAA                        -0.00919 0.00475 
                                 (0.00648) (0.00527) 
lagNL_DSTF                     -0.000254 -0.00130*** 
                                 (0.000231) (0.000411) 
lagEq_TA                       -0.000181 -0.00110 
                                 (0.00113) (0.00144) 
lagIntrBR                      0.000487* 0.00100*** 
                                 (0.000291) (0.000245) 
lagCost_Inc                    -0.00000339 0.0000627 
                                 (0.000426) (0.000514) 
lagzscore                      -0.000403*** -0.000767*** 
                                 (0.000129) (0.000197) 
ILD           3.168** 7.021*** 
                                 (1.270) (1.454) 
Sovereign_Crisis                 -0.00897 0.0350 
                                 (0.0300) (0.0340) 
Global_Crisis                           -0.0590 -0.149*** 
                                 (0.0411) (0.0366) 
_cons                            -0.410** -0.785*** 
                                 (0.175) (0.185) 
Wald Test 
  
(A+C) -.0083** 
 
(B+D) 1.29** 
 
(A+E) -.0033** 
 
(B+F)  .509* 
 
VIF Test 2.15 1.53 
N                                899 1593 
r2                               0.117 0.190 
F                                1.810 2.515 
This table presents the baseline regression results for an unbalanced panel of European Commercial, Investment and Real-estate banks over the 
2008-2012 period. We employ OLS estimator with robust standard error to estimate the following equation: !"#,6789:;92< = α1+ α2 In-Degreei,t-1 + α3 Authorityi,t-1+ α4 In-Degreei,t-1* AssetPurchasej + α5 Authorityi,t-1* AssetPurchasej + α6 In-Degreei,t-1* 
IR_CUTj + α7 Authorityi,t-1* IR_CUTj  + α8 BFi,t-1+α9 ILDz,t + α10 Sovereign_Crisist + α11 Global_Crisist + α12 AssetPurchasej  + α13 IR_CUTj  + 
ei,t !"#,
=:2>?= = α1++α2 In-Degreei,t-1 + α3 Authorityi,t-1 +α4 BFi,t-1+α5 ILDz,t + α6 Sovereign_Crisist + α7 Global_Crisist + ei,t 
Dependent variable is absolute value of CARs. Our main independent variables include lagged values of In-Degree and Authority. BFi,t is a vector 
of Bank Factors including lagged values of  Bank_Size, Eq_TA, NL_DSTF, IntrBR, Z-score, ROAA,  and Cost-income ratio. Bank size is measured 
by the logarithm of total assets. ILD is Interbank Loans-Density. Sovereign_Crisis and Global_Crisis are dummy variables for sovereign crisis and 
global crisis respectively. AssetPurchase and IR_CUT are dummy variables for asset purchase programs and interest rate cuts respectively. VIF 
test reports multicollinearity checks among all variables. All dependent and bank-level control variables are winsorized at 1% - 99%. Standard 
errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
32 
 
Table-6: Impact of system-wide network position on the absolute value of CARs during 
announcements of expansionary and restrictive monetary policies: Banks with strong vs weak local 
interconnectedness 
                                 (1) (2) 
                                 CAR (-1,3) CAR (-1,3)  
Expansionary MP Restrictive MP 
lagIn-Degree75                    -0.00670 -0.0688** 
                                 (0.0260) (0.0343) 
lagAuthority      (A)               1.923** 2.701*** 
                                 (0.977) (0.573) 
lagAuthority*AssetPurchase  (B)     -0.513 
 
                                 (0.815) 
 
lagAuthority*IR_CUT  (C)            -1.351 
 
                                 (0.905) 
 
lagAuthority*lagIn-Degree75    (D)         -1.779* -1.926*** 
                                 (0.923) (0.484) 
lagAuthority*lagIn-Degree75*AssetPurchase   (E)      0.392 
 
                                 (0.837) 
 
lagAuthority*lagIn-Degree75*IR_CUT  (F)       1.385 
 
                                 (0.938) 
 
Wald Test 
  
(A+B) 1.409** 
 
(A+C) .572** 
 
(A+D) .144 .775*** 
(A+B+D+E) .0221 
 
(A+C+D+F) .1785 
 
VIF Test 2.47 1.99 
N                                899 1593 
r2                               0.116 0.182 
F                                1.702 2.268 
This table presents the regression results for an unbalanced panel of European Commercial, Investment and Real-estate banks over the 2008-
2012 period. We employ OLS estimator with robust standard error to estimate the following equation: !"#,6789:;92< = α1+ α2 In-Degree75i,t-1 + α3 Authorityi,t-1+ α4 In-Degree75i,t-1* Authorityi,t-1 + α5 Authorityi,t-1* AssetPurchasej + α6 Authorityi,t-
1* IR_CUTj + α7 In-Degree75i,t-1* Authorityi,t-* AssetPurchasej  + α8 4 In-Degree75i,t-1* Authorityi,t-* IR_CUTi + α9 BFi,t-1+α9 ILDz,t + α10 
Sovereign_Crisist + α11 Global_Crisist + α12 AssetPurchasej  + α13 IR_CUTj  + ei,t !"#,
=:2>?= = α1+α2 In-Degree75i,t-1 + α3 Authorityi,t-1  + α4 In-Degree75i,t-1* Authorityi,t-1 +α5 BFi,t-1+α6 ILDz,t + α7 Sovereign_Crisist + α8 
Global_Crisist + ei,t 
Dependent variable is absolute value of CARs. Our main independent variables include lagged value of Authority. BFi,t is a vector of Bank Factors 
including lagged values of  Bank Size, Eq_TA, NL_DSTF, IntrBR, Z-score, ROAA,  and Cost-income ratio. Bank size is measured by the logarithm 
of total assets. ILD is Interbank Loans-Density. Sovereign_Crisis and Global_Crisis are dummy variables for sovereign crisis and global crisis 
respectively. AssetPurchase and IR_CUT are dummy variables for asset purchase programs and interest rate cuts respectively. In-Degree75 is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one if In-Degree is greater than or equal to the 75th percentile value. VIF test reports multicollinearity 
checks among all variables. All dependent and bank-level control variables are winsorized at 1% - 99%. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Appendix  
Table-A1: The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test for multicollinearity 
Variable VIF 1/VIF    
lagBank_Size 2.2 0.455231 
lagIn-Degree 2.02 0.494357 
lagAuthority 1.44 0.692544 
lagEq_TA 1.78 0.560287 
lagCost_Inc 1.67 0.600468 
lagROAA 1.64 0.609907 
Global_Crisis 1.38 0.722477 
Sovereign_Crisis  1.32 0.758945 
lagzscore 1.29 0.776987 
lagNL_DSTF 1.28 0.782919 
CountryLAATB_CountryTA          1.21 0.829435 
lagIntrBR 1.13 0.883896    
Mean VIF 1.53 
 
VIF test results for Equation 6 
Table-A2: Impact of interbank network variables on the absolute value of CARs belonging to 1-
day, 2-day and 3-day event windows during the announcements of expansionary monetary policies 
                                 (1) (2) (3) 
                                 CAR (-1, 1) CAR (0, 0) CAR (0, 1) 
lagIn-Degree    (A)                  -0.00523** -0.00215** -0.00359** 
                                 (0.00212) (0.000921) (0.00151) 
lagAuthority     (B)                0.977** 0.375** 0.603* 
                                 (0.467) (0.183) (0.318) 
lagIn-Degree*AssetPurchase   (C)    0.00111 -0.000777 -0.000631 
                                 (0.00191) (0.00154) (0.00188) 
lagAuthority*AssetPurchase  (D)    -0.334 0.0675 -0.0552 
                                 (0.391) (0.249) (0.327) 
lagIn-Degree*IR_CUT    (E)           0.00369* 0.000813 0.00191 
                                 (0.00203) (0.000865) (0.00136) 
lagAuthority*IR_CUT   (F)           -0.610 -0.181 -0.380 
                                 (0.439) (0.196) (0.305) 
Wald Test 
   
(A+C) -.004** -.0029 -.0042* 
(B+D) .643** .442* .547* 
(A+E) -.001 -.0013* -.0016** 
(B+F) .367* .194 .222 
N                                899 899 899 
r2                               0.116 0.0785 0.0913 
F                                2.042 2.012 1.839 
This table presents the regression results for an unbalanced panel of European Commercial, Investment and Real-estate banks over the 2008-
2012 period. We employ OLS estimator with robust standard error to estimate the following equation: 
!"#,6789:;92< = α1+ α2 In-Degreei,t-1 + α3 Authorityi,t-1+ α4 In-Degreei,t-1* AssetPurchasej + α5 Authorityi,t-1* AssetPurchasej + α6 In-Degreei,t-1* 
IR_CUTj + α7 Authorityi,t-1* IR_CUTj  + α8 BFi,t-1+α9 ILDz,t + α10 Sovereign_Crisist + α11 Global_Crisist + α12 AssetPurchasej  + α13 IR_CUTj  + 
ei,t 
Dependent variable is absolute value of CARs. Our main independent variables include lagged values of In-Degree and Authority. BFi,t is a vector 
of Bank Factors including lagged values of  Bank Size, Eq_TA, NL_DSTF, IntrBR, Z-score, ROAA,  and Cost-income ratio. Bank size is measured 
by the logarithm of total assets. ILD is Interbank Loans-Density.  Sovereign_Crisis and Global_Crisis are dummy variables for sovereign crisis and 
global crisis respectively. AssetPurchase and IR_CUT are dummy variables for asset purchase programs and interest rate cuts respectively. All 
dependent and bank-level control variables are winsorized at 1% - 99%. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table-A3: Impact of interbank network variables on the absolute value of CARs belonging to 1-
day, 2-day and 3-day event windows during the announcements of restrictive monetary policy 
                                 (1) (2) (3) 
                                 CAR (-1, 1) CAR (0, 0) CAR (0, 1) 
lagIn-Degree                 -0.00914*** -0.00317*** -0.00603*** 
                                 (0.00206) (0.000765) (0.00142) 
lagAuthority               1.487*** 0.525*** 0.993*** 
                                 (0.314) (0.114) (0.212)     
N                                1593 1593 1593 
r2                               0.177 0.164 0.169 
F                                2.715 3.608 2.968 
This table presents the regression results for an unbalanced panel of European Commercial, Investment and Real-estate banks over the 2008-
2012 period. We employ OLS estimator with robust standard error to estimate the following equation: 
!"#,
=:2>?= = α1++α2 In-Degreei,t-1 + α3 Authorityi,t-1 +α4 BFi,t-1+α5 ILDz,t + α6 Sovereign_Crisist + α7 Global_Crisist + ei,t 
Dependent variable is absolute value of CARs. Our main independent variables are lagged values of In-Degree and Authority. BFi,t is a vector of 
Bank Factors including lagged values of  Bank Size, Eq_TA, NL_DSTF, IntrBR, Z-score, ROAA,  and Cost-income ratio. Bank Size is measured 
by the logarithm of total assets. ILD is Interbank Loans-Density. Sovereign_Crisis and Global_Crisis are dummy variables for sovereign crisis and 
global crisis respectively. All dependent and bank-level control variables are winsorized at 1% - 99%. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, 
**, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Table-A4: Impact of interbank network variables on the absolute value of CARs using alternative 
measures of network variables 
                                 (1) (2) 
                                 CAR (-1,3) CAR (-1,3)  
Expansionary MP Restrictive MP 
lagDegree   (A)                     -0.00544** -0.00981*** 
                                 (0.00211) (0.00208) 
lagCloseness   (B)                       0.616* 1.208*** 
                                 (0.331) (0.252) 
lagDegree*AssetPurchase  (C)        -0.000834 
 
                                 (0.00206) 
 
lagCloseness*AssetPurchase   (D)        -0.00434 
 
                                 (0.412) 
 
lagDegree*IR_CUT   (E)              0.00333* 
 
                                 (0.00189) 
 
lagCloseness*IR_CUT    (F)               -0.697* 
 
                                 (0.357) 
 
Wald Test 
  
(A+C) -.0062** 
 
(B+D) .6114* 
 
(A+E) -.0021** 
 
(B+F) -.0817 
 
N                                899 1593 
r2                               0.125 0.210 
F                                1.726 2.477 
This table presents the regression results for an unbalanced panel of European Commercial, Investment and Real-estate banks over the 2008-
2012 period. We employ OLS estimator with robust standard error to estimate the following equations: 
!"#,6789:;92< = α1+ α2 Degreei,t-1 + α3 Closenessi,t-1+ α4 Degreei,t-1* AssetPurchasej + α5 Closenessi,t-1* AssetPurchasej + α6 Degreei,t-1* IR_CUTj 
+ α7 Closenessi,t-1* IR_CUTj  + α8 BFi,t-1+α9 ILDz,t + α10 Sovereign_Crisist + α11 Global_Crisist + α12 AssetPurchasej  + α13 IR_CUTj  + ei,t 
!"#,
=:2>?= = α1++α2 Degreei,t-1 + α3 Closenessi,t-1 +α4 BFi,t-1+α5 ILDz,t + α6 Sovereign_Crisist + α7 Global_Crisist + ei,t 
Dependent variable is absolute value of CARs. Our main independent variables include lagged values of Degree and Closeness. BFi,t is a vector of 
Bank Factors including lagged values of Bank Size, Eq_TA, NL_DSTF, IntrBR, Z-score, ROAA,  and Cost-income ratio. Bank Size is measured 
by the logarithm of total assets. ILD is Interbank Loans-Density. Sovereign_Crisis and Global_Crisis are dummy variables for sovereign crisis and 
global crisis respectively. AssetPurchase and IR_CUT are dummy variables for asset purchase programs and interest rate cuts respectively. All 
dependent and bank-level control variables are winsorized at 1% - 99%. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table-A5: Impact of interbank network variables on the absolute value of CARs: Size dummy and 
Orthogonalizing Bank size and In-Degree 
                                 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
                                 CAR (-1,3) CAR (-1,3) CAR (-1,3) CAR (-1,3)  
Expansionary MP Restrictive MP Expansionary MP Restrictive MP 
lagIn-Degree    (A)                  -0.00731** -0.0134*** -0.00705** -0.0127*** 
                                 (0.00339) (0.00281) (0.00333) (0.00266) 
lagAuthority     (B)                1.742** 2.640*** 1.699** 2.547*** 
                                 (0.851) (0.540) (0.835) (0.524) 
lagIn-Degree*AssetPurchase   (C)    0.000349 
 
0.000496 
 
                                 (0.00337) 
 
(0.00336) 
 
lagAuthority*AssetPurchase  (D)    -0.423 
 
-0.410 
 
                                 (0.680) 
 
(0.679) 
 
lagIn-Degree*IR_CUT    (E)           0.00550 
 
0.00554 
 
                                 (0.00345) 
 
(0.00344) 
 
lagAuthority*IR_CUT   (F)           -1.167 
 
-1.190 
 
                                 (0.750) 
 
(0.754) 
 
IR_CUT                           0.00706 
 
0.00864 
 
                                 (0.0268) 
 
(0.0266) 
 
AssetPurchase                    0.00920 
 
0.00822 
 
                                 (0.0265) 
 
(0.0266) 
 
lagSize_Dummy                     0.00475 0.0266 
  
                                 (0.0197) (0.0265) 
  
lagOr_LNTA                     
  
0.0218*** 0.0344*** 
                                 
  
(0.00823) (0.0114) 
Wald Test 
    
(A+C) -.0069*** 
 
-.0069*** 
 
(B+D) 1.318*** 
 
1.318*** 
 
(A+E) -.0018 
 
-.0018 
 
(B+F) .574** 
 
.574** 
 
N                                899 1593 899 1593 
r2                               0.115 0.189 0.115 0.189 
F                                1.738 2.590 1.738 2.590 
This table presents the regression results for an unbalanced panel of European Commercial, Investment and Real-estate banks over the 2008-
2012 period. We employ OLS estimator with robust standard error to estimate the following equation: 
!"#,6789:;92< = α1+ α2 In-Degreei,t-1 + α3 Authorityi,t-1+ α4 In-Degreei,t-1* AssetPurchasej + α5 Authorityi,t-1* AssetPurchasej + α6 In-Degreei,t-1* 
IR_CUTj + α7 Authorityi,t-1* IR_CUTj  + α8 BFi,t-1+α9 ILDz,t + α10 Sovereign_Crisist + α11 Global_Crisist + α12 AssetPurchasej  + α13 IR_CUTj  + 
ei,t 
Dependent variable is absolute value of CARs. Our main independent variables include lagged value of In-Degree and Authority. BFi,t is a vector 
of Bank Factors including lagged values of  Size, Eq_TA, NL_DSTF, IntrBR, Z-score, ROAA,  and Cost-income ratio. Size is measured by the 
lagged values of the Orthogonal vector of bank size (columns 3 to 4) and size dummy (columns 1 to 2). Size dummy takes the value of one for 
small banks (banks with total assets less than one billion Euro) and zero otherwise. ILD is Interbank Loans-Density.  Sovereign_Crisis and 
Global_Crisis are dummy variables for sovereign crisis and global crisis respectively. AssetPurchase and IR_CUT are dummy variables for asset 
purchase programs and interest rate cuts respectively. All dependent and bank-level control variables are winsorized at 1% - 99%. Standard errors 
are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table-A6: Impact of interbank network variables on the absolute value of CARs using an 
alternative definition of high borrowing structure diversification (In-Degree50) 
                                 (1) (2) 
                                 CAR (-1, 3) CAR (-1, 3) 
 Expansionary MP Restrictive MP 
lagInDegree50                    -0.0871*** -0.178*** 
                                 (0.0286) (0.0444) 
lagAuthority      (A)               2.334** 4.933*** 
                                 (1.083) (1.054) 
lagAuthority*AssetPurchase  (B)     0.391 
 
                                 (0.633) 
 
lagAuthority*IR_CUT  (C)            -0.503 
 
                                 (0.584) 
 
lagAuthority*lagInDegree50    (D)         -1.376** -3.247*** 
                                 (0.673) (0.794) 
lagAuthority*lagInDegree50*AssetPurchase   (E)      -0.0478* 
 
                                 (0.0276) 
 
lagAuthority*lagInDegree50*IR_CUT  (F)       -0.00174 
 
                                 (0.0165) 
 
Wald Test 
  
(A+B) 2.725*** 
 
(A+C) 1.831** 
 
(A+D) .9578** 1.686*** 
(A+B+D+E) 1.301** 
 
(A+C+D+F) .4533 
 
N                                899 1593 
r2                               0.131 0.211 
F                                1.918 2.499 
This table presents the regression results for an unbalanced panel of European Commercial, Investment and Real-estate banks over the 2008-
2012 period. We employ OLS estimator with robust standard error to estimate the following equation: !"#,6789:;92< = α1+ α2 In-Degree50i,t-1 + α3 Authorityi,t-1+ α4 In-Degree50i,t-1* Authorityi,t-1 + α5 Authorityi,t-1* AssetPurchasej + α6 Authorityi,t-
1* IR_CUTj + α7 In-Degree50i,t-1* Authorityi,t-* AssetPurchasej  + α8 4 In-Degree50i,t-1* Authorityi,t-* IR_CUTi + α9 BFi,t-1+α9 ILDz,t + α10 
Sovereign_Crisist + α11 Global_Crisist + α12 AssetPurchasej  + α13 IR_CUTj  + ei,t !"#,
=:2>?= = α1+α2 In-Degree50i,t-1 + α3 Authorityi,t-1  + α4 In-Degree50i,t-1* Authorityi,t-1 +α5 BFi,t-1+α6 ILDz,t + α7 Sovereign_Crisist + α8 
Global_Crisist + ei,t 
Dependent variable is absolute value of CARs. Our main independent variable is lagged value of Authority. BFi,t is a vector of Bank Factors 
including lagged values of  Bank Size, Eq_TA, NL_DSTF, IntrBR, Z-score, ROAA,  and Cost-income ratio. Bank Size is measured by the logarithm 
of total assets. ILD is Interbank Loans-Density. Sovereign_Crisis and Global_Crisis are dummy variables for sovereign crisis and global crisis 
respectively. AssetPurchase and IR_CUT are dummy variables for asset purchase programs and interest rate cuts respectively. In-Degree50 is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one if In-Degree is greater than or equal to the median value. All dependent and bank-level control variables 
are winsorized at 1% - 99%. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
